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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BENTLEY WILSON, ; 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ) 
BRENDA HALTON WILSON, ) 
Respondent/Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 20070359-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2001 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues raised by the Appellant are as follows: 
First, does the adoption of the Appellee's position that the alimony and child 
support terms of the temporary order survived the entry of the Amended Decree render 
the Amended Findings of Fact defective and legally insufficient. 
"
 c[0]rders . . . setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed/ [and thus, the Court] 
review[s] alimony awards under an abuse of discretion standard." Olsen v. Olsen, 169 
P.3d 765 (Utah App.,2007) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)). 
Similarly, the Court reviews modifications of alimony under an abuse of discretion 
1 
standard. See Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 173 (Utah App. 2007). To the extent questions of law 
are concerned, they are reviewed for correctness. See id Alimony must be based upon 
detailed findings related to the statutory elements. Id, 
Similarly, child support orders must be based upon the statutory factors contained 
in U.C.A. 78-45-7 (1998 as Amended). Because the determination of those factors 
involves questions of fact, the Court examines the trial court's findings of fact and defers 
to those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 
(Utah App. 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). It is well-established 
that "[fjailure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontrovcrted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment.5 "Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 137 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[t]he findings 
'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.' " Id. (quoting 
Ruckerv. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). 
Second, is a stipulation of the parties that is in derogation of the parties' burden to 
present evidence regarding alimony and child support and conflicts with the duty of the 
trial court to enter specific findings, enforceable. Questions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of law, 
2 
which we review for correctness." Wall v. Wall, 157 P.3d 341 (Utah App.,2007); Van Dyke 
v. Van Dyke, 86 P.3d 767 (Utah App. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Third, did the trial court commit error when it interpreted the language contained 
in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree as incorporating the 
alimony and child support obligations established in the temporary order of August 11, 
2004. 
The Court interprets the language in a divorce decree according to established 
rules of contract interpretation. Cf. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[w]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous, 
any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268. A court must "consider the writing 
in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. If the court considers such evidence and 
determines that the language of the contract is unambiguous, "then the parties' intentions 
must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Id. "Language in a written 
document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to support two or more 
plausible meanings." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added); see also R & R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (" To 
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.' " 
(citation omitted)). Finally, whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which 
the reviewing court reviews for corcectness. See Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 
3 
1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996). 
Fourth, as a matter of equity as required by the statutes authorizing alimony and 
child support, are the parties entitled to a hearing on the merits to determine the 
appropriate amount of child support and alimony to be effective with the entry of the 
decree of divorce in this matter. 
The trial court's ruling regarding alimony and child support is reviewed by the 
Appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Howell v. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE LOWER COURT 
Each of the issues was fully preserved by the Appellant/Petitioner in the lower 
court in his legal memorandum, formal Objection and argument at the hearings 
conducted by the Commissioner and Judge Stott. (R. 575-605; 611-12; 613-644; Hearing 
Transcript 1/2/2007, R. 811; Hearing Transcript 9/18/2006, R. 810) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutes that the Petitioner/Appellant deem determinative of the issues raised 
in this matter include the following. 
First as to the required elements and findings to support a child support award, 
U.C.A. 78-45-7(2)-(4) (1998 as Amended) provides: 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has 
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) 
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has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support 
shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but 
not limited to: (a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the 
relative wealth and income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult 
child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult 
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the needs of the 
obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the 
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in 
this chapter. 
Second, as to the required elements and findings to support an alimony award, 
U.C.A. 30-3-5(8) (2006 as Amended) provides: 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) 
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability 
of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) 
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
5 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding al imony.. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After the entry of Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Decree, a dispute arose between the parties as to the scope of the issues reserved therein 
for future hearing. The Respondent maintained that the alimony and child support levels 
established under the temporary order, predating the Decree and Amended Decree, 
continued through and were incorporated in the Amended Decree. Thus, the Respondent 
maintained that she was entitled to a determination of arrearages, based upon the alimony 
and child support payments ordered under the temporary order of August 11, 2004. 
The Appellant/Petitioner maintained that the child support and alimony levels 
established in the temporary order terminated upon the entry of the Decree and Amended 
Decree and that he was entitled to a hearing establishing the child support and alimony 
6 
levels effective with the entry of the Decree and Amended Decree based upon the then 
existing conditions of the parties. The Appellant contended that the provision in the 
Amended Decree allowing him six months to pursue a reduction in child support and 
alimony referred only to his right to seek a reduction in the temporary child support and 
alimony from the date of the Temporary Order to the date the Decree was entered in the 
matter. Petitioner further contended that the findings of fact contained in the Decree and 
Amended Decree were legally insufficient to support an award of alimony and child 
support. 
Commissioner Patton heard the matter and adopted the position of the 
Respondent/Appellee. Appellant/Petitioner filed an Objection to the recommendation and 
Judge Stott, in reviewing the Objection, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
a Judgment, which, for the most part, adopted the position of the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. General Background of the Parties and the Action. 
The Complaint for divorce was filed by the Appellant/Petitioner on December 19, 
2003. The parties, as recited in the complaint for divorce, were married on July 30, 1984. 
Four children were bom as issue of the marriage, only three of whom were minors at the 
time of filing. l(R. 19-20) 
i 
Daile Christina Wilson, born November 12, 1984 (23 yrs. old); Madelyne Anne 
Wilson, born September 11, 1988 (19 yrs. old); Bentley Dunford Wilson II, born 
7 
B. The August 11, 2004 Order of Temporary Support. 
After the filing of the Complaint, the parties filed various motions for temporary 
orders. Those motions were resolved with the preparation and execution of a Stipulation 
of Temporaiy Support, which was filed with the trial court on June 24, 2004. (R. 55-57; 
Addendum, Exhibit "A") The terms of the stipulation were reduced to an Order of 
Temporary Support, filed with the court on August 11, 2004. (R. 98-101; Addendum, 
Exhibit "A") Central to the issues raised in this appeal, the Order of Temporaiy Support 
provided: 
. . . 2. Custody/Parent time. The Mother [Respondent] is awarded 
temporaiy physical custody of the minor children, subject to the Father's 
[Petitioner] right to parent time with the children at reasonable times and 
places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in 
accordance with U.C.A.. 30-3-35; however, the wishes of the children will 
be considered and the children will not be forced to participate in parent 
time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the children from 
Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday. . . The Father will also have one week of 
extended visitation with the children in the summer. 
3. Child Support. The Father represents his gross monthly income is 
approximately $10,000 per month. The Respondent is currently 
unemployed. The Father will pay child support of $700 per month per 
child. The child support obligation of the Father shall be effective June 1, 
2004 [the month in which the stipulation was reached], and continue during 
the pendency of this action. Each party will pay one-half [of] all costs of 
extracurricular activities for the children. 
September 11, 1993 (14 yrs. old); and, William McKinlcy Wilson, born May 6, 1997 
(lOyrs. old). 
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4. Credit. The Petitioner shall receive credit for all child support amounts 
paid in June, which was $2,250. 
5. Alimony. The Wife is awarded a sum of $4,000 per month as temporary 
alimony from the Husband, commencing June 1, 2004, and continuing 
during the pendency of this action. . . . 
R. 98-101; Addendum, Exhibit "A". 
C. The August 26, 2004 Order on Order to Show Cause, 
After the stipulation that was reached in June, 2004 (resulting in the August 11, 
2004 Order), an order to show cause was personally served on the Respondent by the 
Petitioner requiring her attendance at a hearing before the domestic relations 
commissioner on August 5, 2004. The Respondent neither appeared in person or nor 
through counsel at the appointed time and the Commissioner granted the request of the 
Petitioner for relief under his request for temporary orders. (R. 97). 
The Order on Order to Show Cause, authorized at the August 5, 2004 hearing, was 
actually signed and entered in the court record on August 26, 2004. (R. 107-109, 
Addendum, Exhibit "B") The Order, signed by both the Commissioner and the assigned 
district court judge, provided in relevant part, as follows: 
1. The Petitioner is hereby granted the temporary physical custody of the 
minor children. . . . (Emphasis added) 
9 
A stipulation and order was entered by the court, on September 24, 2004, 
orchestrating visitation by the Respondent pending the scheduled hearing on September 
28, 2004. (R. 287-294) 
D. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree Dated 
October 7, 2004. 
On September 28, 2004, the parties, in the course of negotiating the pending 
motions and orders to show cause, were able to resolve all the issues attendant to the 
divorce action, and a stipulation was stated on the record. (R. 295) 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, memorializing 
the stipulation of the parties were filed on October 7, 2004. (R. 313-339; Addendum, 
Exhibit "C") The relevant language in the Decree is as follows: 
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of 
he minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the 
primary physical custody of the minor children. [Paragraph 4 then recited in 
detail the Petitioner's visitation rights] . . . 
6. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and 
alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be 
reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain 
further information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
7. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children 
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the 
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
8. The financial, real and personal property issues are reserved. . . . 
10 
14. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by 
the trial court. 
Id. 
E. The Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
Dated November 2, 2004. 
On November 2, 2004, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree were entered in accordance with the stipulation of the parties. (R. 347-370; 
Addendum, Exhibit "D") The changes in the language cited above are highlighted below: 
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of 
he minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the 
primary physical custody of the minor children. [Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 
then recite in detail the Petitioner's visitation rights and parenting plan] . . . 
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which 
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and 
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. 
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved 
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children 
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the 
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
10. All other issues are reserved. 
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by 
the trial court. (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
11 
F. Proceedings Resulting in the Judgment Against Petitioner 
Counsel for the Petitioner withdrew and no action was taken until a request for 
pretrial conference, filed by the Respondent, resulted in the reappearance of counsel for 
the Petitioner and a pretrial conference on December 8, 2005. (R. 447, 458-59, 461, 466-
67) At the pretrial conference, the Petitioner was ordered to comply with discovery 
requests sent by thee Respondent by January 3, 2006. (R. 466-67) An Order 
memorializing the commissioner's ruling was entered on January 19, 2006. (R. 471-73) 
At the continued pretrial conference on January 31, 2006, the parties represented 
that discovery has been completed and that the parties needed additional time to review 
the exchanged information. (R. 474) On July 20, 2006, counsel for the Respondent is 
ordered to prepare a pretrial order. (R. 511) In a telephonic conference held on August 22, 
2006, the lawyers for the parties represented to the court that discovery had not yet been 
completed and the matter was continued without date. (R. 546) 
Counsel for the Respondent, in a counter-affidavit, which was primarily addressing 
the ongoing visitation issues, made a claim for arrearages based upon the child support 
and alimony payment levels established under the Temporary Order of August 11, 2004. 
(R. 549-57) The Petitioner filed an Objection to Hearing and Motion to Strike Request for 
Judgment. (R. 575-605) 
On September 18, 2006, the minutes recite that the Commissioner found that the 
Respondent was entitled to all arrearages based upon the child support and alimony award 
12 
set out in the August 11, 2004 temporary order. Commissioner Patton held that the 
Temporary Order from August 11, 2004 was not modified and remained in force and that 
it continued to be in force. Commissioner Patton recommended an order reflecting that 
the Appellant/Petitioner failed to take any action during the six months in which he could 
have altered the Temporary Order. Commissioner Patton recommended a judgment be 
entered for past due alimony and child support in the amount of $108,116.00 through 
September 6, 2006. (R. 611-12) The oral ruling was reduced to an Order and Judgment 
that was filed on October 25, 2006. (R. 657-661; Addendum, Exhibit "E") 
The Petitioner filed an Objection to the recommendation of the Commissioner on 
September 20, 2006. (R. 606-654) Oral arguments on the Objection were conducted by 
Judge Gary D. Stott on January 2, 2007 and the court took the matter under advisement. 
(R. 686; R. 811 (transcript of January 2, 2007 argument)) 
Judge Stott entered his Ruling on January 10, 2007 (R. 687-692) The Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment memorializing Judge Stott's Ruling were entered 
March 27, 2007. (R. 798-804; Addendum, Exhibit "F") 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of March 27, 2007, 
provided as follows: 
1. On August 11, 2004, a Temporary Order was entered regarding 
alimony and child support. In that Order respondent was given temporary 
physical custody and Petitioner was awarded visitation. In that Order child 
support was set for $700 per-month per-child and $4,000 per-month of 
alimony was awarded to Respondent. 
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2. On August 26, 2004, custody was changed to the Petitioner and 
Respondent was given visitation. 
3. On September 22, 2004, another order was entered into a Stipulation 
which resulted in a Decree of Divorce, which was signed and entered on 
October 7, 2004. It appears that Petitioner had custody of the children from 
August 26, 2004 to October 7, 2004. 
4. The Divorce Decree changed custody from the Petitioner to the 
Respondent. The Decree reserved the issue of what amounts Petitioner 
needed to pay for the months of August and September of 2004. The 
section of the Decree that is most germane to this Ruling is paragraph eight 
which reads: 
The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and 
alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted 
shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able 
to obtain further information regarding Petitioner's actual income. 
(Emphasis added) 
5. Six months came and passed and the Petitioner failed to file a 
document with the court, or make any attempt to verify his allegedly 
modified income. 
6. The Commissioner held a hearing on September 18, 2006, wherein 
he considered the facts that are presently before this court. The 
Commissioner held in part that 1) the Temporary Order from August 11, 
2004, was not modified and remained in force, 2) Petitioner had failed to 
take any action during the six months in which he could have altered the 
Temporary Order, 3) Petitioner owed $108,116.00 through September, 
2006. 
7. The Commissioner's decision was based on the information provided 
by the parties and appellate court decisions. The commissioner discussed 
the Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987), case, but found that the 
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Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992) decision was 
more applicable to the facts before the court. The Commissioner noted that 
Whitehead stood for the general rule that "once temporary support 
obligations become due, they are no more retroactively modifiable than 
final decrees" but also provided for some exceptions to this rule. The 
Commissioner noted that Petitioner asked the court to "carve out an 
exception to the general rule prohibiting retroactive modification of family 
support obligations." Id. at 816. It was the finding of the Commissioner 
that the time for applying any such exception to the general rule lapsed 
when Petitioner failed to act within the six months contemplated by the 
Divorce Decree. He therefore entered Judgment in favor of the 
Respondent, holding Petitioner responsible for any and all obligations for 
which he could not provide proof of payment for within two weeks. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, hereby enters the 
following Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
1. Having carefully considered the Commissioner findings, the relevant 
case law, and the arguments offered by the parties the Petitioner's Objection 
is granted in part, and denied in part. 
2. The judgment recommended by the Commissioner was $108,116.00. 
This court is persuaded that Petitioner should not be responsible for the 
child support payments from August 26, 2004, to October 7, 2004, when the 
Divorce Decree was signed. This court is aware that child support orders 
typically remain in force despite a temporary custody change, as agreed by 
the parties. In this instance, however, the court will excuse Petitioner from 
payment of child support for a month and a half, which is effectively the 
amount of time he had custody of the children. The exact amount excused 
is $700 per-child for the month, and $350 per-child for the half month. It 
should be noted, however, that Petitioner is still responsible for alimony for 
this time period. Therefore, Judgment is granted to the Respondent, 
Brenda Wilson, against the Petitioner in the amount of SI07,066.00 for his 
past child support and alimony obligations owed through September 2006. 
3. This court does not believe that the Commissioner wrongfully 
entered judgment based on Temporary Orders that were superseded by the 
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Divorce Decree, and thereby denies this portion of Petitioner's objection. 
This decision is supported by the Divorce Decree and the relevant case law. 
4. Petitioner alleges that the "temporary orders merged into the Decree 
of Divorce and cannot be enforced when the Decree of Divorce does not 
specifically continue the temporary orders." Petitioner discussed the case 
of Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987) which holds that, "payments 
that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to 
judgment after entry of the final decree, despite the failure of that decree to 
expressly preserve them." Petitioner argues that this holding is inapplicable 
to the present facts because the "Decree is specifically different than the 
temporary orders." 
5. While the Decree and Order are different they are not mutually 
exclusive, and in fact the Decree implicitly adopts the Temporary Order. 
Paragraph eight demonstrates this when it notes, (t)he Petitioner has 
requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The issue of 
whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for period of 
six months so that each party is able to obtain further information regarding 
Petitioner's actual income. 
6. In order for an award to be reduced the award must have existed in 
the first place. This paragraph implicitly acknowledges that Petitioner is 
seeking a reduction of the Temporary Order. The $700 per-child and 
$4,000 in alimony are the only amounts that had ever been entered and are 
logically the amounts referred to in the Decree. 
7. As the Whitehead court observed there are some exceptions to the 
general rule prohibiting the modification of temporary support obligations, 
however, Petitioner cannot avail himself of these exceptions. As the Decree 
notes, the Petitioner had six months to provide accurate information 
regarding his income and thereby adjust the wards entered in the Temporary 
Order. Petitioner failed to take any action during this time when the 
possibility of modification existed. It is therefore disingenuous for 
Petitioner to now claim that the inclusion of the Temporary Order in the 
Decree was wrongful when its inclusion was the direct result of his 
inaction. 
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8. In Summary, the Objection to ihe Commissioner's recommendation 
is granted in part and denied in part. The Objection is well taken inasmuch 
as Petitioner should not owe for the amount of time the children were in his 
custody. The Objection is denied, however, as it relates to inclusion of ihe 
Temporary Order in the Divorce Decree. It is the finding of this court that 
the Temporary Order entered on August 11, 2004, was implicitly adopted 
by Decree of Divorce and that the Judgment entered by the Commissioner 
was correct with the excused amounts listed in paragraph 2 in this section 
entitled Conclusions of Law and Judgment above. 
Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant contends first that the construction of the Temporary Order and 
Amended Decree urged by the Respondent/Appellee would require a determination that 
the Decree and Amended Decree are defective and legally insufficient, because of the 
lack of the required findings of fact. A legally sufficient determination of child support 
and alimony requires a detailed delineation of elements that are entirely missing from the 
Temporary Order and Amended Findings of Fact. Appellant's contention that the 
Amended Decree preserved the issue of alimony and child support determination for a 
future date, creates a mechanism, consistent with the law, where the trial court could 
conduct a hearing and make the required findings of fact regarding the income, needs and 
other circumstances of the parties relevant to a child support and alimony determination 
that was to commence with the entry of the decree of divorce. 
The Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 and the subsequent Amended Findings 
were based upon the stipulation of the parties. However, a stipulation of the paities 
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cannot waive or negate the responsibility of the parties to provide evidence regarding the 
relevant factors for detemiining child support and alimony. Further, the trial court's duty 
to enter detailed findings regarding alimony and chid support and its continuing 
jurisdiction cannot be waived or limited by a stipulation of the parties. Based thereon, 
any construction of the Amended Findings that would carryover the terms of the 
temporary order would be contrary to the obligation of the trial court to enter detailed 
findings based upon the evidence to support child support and alimony determinations. 
The only way the factual scenario in this case can be interpreted, consistent with the 
duties of the parties and the trial court, is that the terms of the temporary order terminated 
upon the entry of the decree and that the court reserved for further hearing the issue as to 
the amount of child support and alimony that were to take effect upon the entry of the 
decree. 
Third, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the language contained in the 
Amended Findings, Conclusions and Decree. Applying the same rules applicable to the 
interpretation of a contract, this Court should determine that the terms of the temporary 
order of August 11, 2004, terminated upon the entry of Decree in this matter. Further, 
this Court should adjudge that the determination of child support and alimony levels, to 
be effective with the entry of the decree, were reserved for future determination. In fact, 
that conclusion is supported by the efforts of the parties to conduct discovery on their 
respective income and expenses. If the trial court found the language in the amended 
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decree ambiguous, it should have allowed an evidentiary hearing as to the intent of the 
parties. 
Fourth, based upon the mandate contained in the relevant statutes and case law, the 
equities of this case certainly entitle the parties to a fair hearing where all the evidence as 
to income, expenses and the other statutory factors can be heard by the court and a fair 
and legally supportable order entered therefrom. The evidence submitted by affidavit 
from the exchanged discovery reveals that the terms of the temporary order regarding the 
levels of alimony and child support are not supported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT ARE DEFICIENT 
AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ALIMONY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT AWARD CONTAINED IN THE TEMPORARY ORDER. 
It is the Appellant's position that the trial court reserved, in the Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree, the determination of the alimony and 
child support levels that would commence effective with the entry of the divorce decree 
in this matter. The adoption of the Appellee's position that seeks to carry over the 
determination of the temporary award of child support and alimony, into the Amended 
Decree, would result in factually unsupported and legally deficient findings of fact. 
A. The Amended Findings of Fact are Bereft of the Required 
Elements, 
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The Appellant submits that the Amended Findings of Fact do not contain or even 
reference the elements required to support an award of child support and alimony. (R. 
347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D") This is not a case where the sufficiency of die 
underlying findings supporting an award of child support or alimony are at issue. Rather, 
this is a case where there are no relevant findings on the issues related to the award of 
child support and alimony. 
The Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 also does not contain a single relevant 
finding. The only relevant language contained in the Temporary Order is that "[t]he 
Father represents his gross monthly income is approximately $10,000 per month. The 
Respondent is currently unemployed." (R. 98-101; Addendum, Exhibit "A") The 
Commissioner did not even make any findings in the Temporary Order based upon the 
representations of the "approximate" income. The Amended Findings are also silent in 
converting any representations of the parties into factual findings. 
B. This Requirement of Detailed Findings to Support an Award of 
Alimony and Child Support is Clear in Utah Law. 
1. Findings Requirements for a Child Support Award 
The requirement of specific findings to support a child support award are statutory. 
U.C.A. 78-45-7(2) and (3) (1998 as Amended) provides: 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has 
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) 
has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support 
shall require each parly to file a proposed award of child support using the 
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guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but 
not limited to: (a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the 
relative wealth and income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult 
child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult 
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the needs of the 
obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the 
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Unifomi Child Support Guidelines described in 
this chapter. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that because the statutory factors involve 
questions of fact, the reviewing court must examine the trial court's findings of fact and 
defer to those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987). However, it is welJ-established that "[fjailure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.5 " 
Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In addition, "[tjhe findings 'should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached.5 55 Id. (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(Utah 1979)). 
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The Court in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), was clear that 
U.C.A. 78-45-7 requires the trial court to consider at least the seven factors listed therein. 
Further, the Court held, those factors constitute material issues upon which the trial court 
must enter findings of fact. Finally, although "trial courts have broad discretion in 
selecting an appropriate method of assessing a spouse's income . . . {Griffith v. Griffith, 
985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999), . . . the trial court must make detailed findings on all material 
issues, ... which 'should ... include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Rehn v\ Rehn 974 P.2d 306 
(Utah App. 1999) (second omission in original) (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah Ct.App.1988)). 
There can be no question that the Amended Findings of Fact in this case fail to 
include even one relevant finding on the required elements of a \alid child support order. 
2. Findings Requirements for an Alimony Award 
The elements that a trial court must consider with regard to the award o^ alimony 
are also statutory. U.C.A. 30-3-5(8) (2006 as Amended) provides: 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (hi) the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) 
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
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education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
Id. 
As noted in Olsen v. Olsen, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)) and Sill v. Sill 164 P.3d 17? (Utah 
App. 2007, Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires trial courts to consider "'al least1' 
certain named factors, including, in part: "(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; [and] 
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(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-
(iii) (Supp.2007); see also Rehti v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999) (In determining 
the amount of alimony, "a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the 
earning capacity of the recipient spouse; [and] the ability of the obligor spouse to provide 
support."). 
Further, the same case law requires trial courts to make findings on each of the 
factors. The "findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 764 (Utah 
App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A trial court's failure to provide adequate 
findings is reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record." Id. In Andrus, 
this Court reversed and remanded where the findings of fact did not address the husband's 
"tax obligations and monthly net income," and the "'trial court's findings of fact [were] not 
sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took determining Husband's disposable income." 
Id. 
Again, there is no question that the Amended Findings of Fact do not contain a 
factual finding as to any of the required elements. 
C Only the Adoption of the Appellant's Position Secures the Legal 
Sufficiency of the Amended Findings, 
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Appellant submits that there can be no question as to the insufficiency of the 
underlying Amended Findings, if this Court were adopt the argument urged by Appellee. 
If the two sentences dedicated to alimony and child support, in the Temporary Order of 
August 11, 2004, were intended by the trial court to comprise the total findings on 
alimony and child support, there is simply no arguable basis upon which to urge their 
legal sufficiency under the statutes and case law detailed above. 
On the other hand, if the temporary order was to terminate effective with the entry 
of the decree of divorce and if the reservation of issues included in the Amended Decree 
was construed to include the determination of alimony and child support awards to be 
effective from the date of the decree, there would be no legal insufficiency in the findings 
as it relates to child support and alimony. This matter would simply be remanded for a 
hearing on the relevant factors to aid the trial court in determining the necessary facts to 
support a legally defensible alimony and child support award. 
POINT II: THE AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE-
SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO DEPRIVE THE COURT OF 
JURISDICTION TO MAKE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
There is no question that the terms of the Temporary Order dated August 11, 2004 
and the Amended Findings'of Fact were based upon the stipulation of the parties. The 
relevant language, as it relates to the child support and alimony, contained in the 
Amended Findings is as follows: 
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8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which 
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and 
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. 
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved 
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children 
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the 
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
10. All other issues are reserved. 
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by 
the trial court. (Emphasis added) 
(R. 347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D") 
If, as the Appellee urges, the intent of the Amended Findings was to carry over the 
alimony and child support obligations from the August 11 Temporary Order into the 
Amended Decree, such as interpretation would conflict with the trial court's statutory 
obligation of entering the required findings regardless of the terms of the stipulation of 
the parties. 
The controlling statutes and case law require the trial court to take testimony and 
receive evidence preparatory to entering the statutorily required findings related to child 
support and alimony. The Appellee is arguing that the parties stipulated to the cany-over 
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of the temporary order provisions into the Amended Decree, thereby eliminating the 
responsibility of the trial court to make the requisite findings of fact. 
The case law is clear however, that the parties may not so stipulate to deprive the 
trial court of jurisdiction and its statutory obligation. In Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 415 (Utah 
App.,2007), the Court considered the enforceability of a non-modification clause2 and 
determined that the non-modification clause, even if incorporated into a decree does not 
divest the trial court of its statutory continuing jurisdiction. Id. 
In Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754 (Utah App.,2007), the husband challenged the 
trial court's decision to adhere to a portion of a stipulation, which precluded consideration 
of the wife's income in calculating child support payments. Id. The Court analyzed the 
matter as follows: 
Utah Code sections 78-45-3 and 78-45-4 respectively require every father 
and every mother to provide support to their children. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-45-3 to-4 (2002). 'The right to support from the parents belongs to 
the minor children and is not subject to being bartered away, extinguished, 
estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the 
parents." Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 51 7 (Utah 1981). Parents have "the 
duty to support the children fthey] ha[ve] brought into the world. This duty 
is inalienable and [parents] cannot rid [themselves] of it by purporting to 
transfer it to someone else, by contract or otherwise." Gulley v. Galley, 570 
P.2d 127, 128-29 (Utah 1977). 
The subject settlement agreement included a stipulation specifying that "[t]he 
provisions of th[e] [Ajgreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of 
Divorce which implements it with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not 
been disclosed and divided in th[e] [Ajgreement, those may be brought back before 
the [c]ourt for appropriate disposition." Id. 
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Ill both Hills and Galley, the Utah Supreme Court addressed efforts of a 
parent who had attempted to contract away the duty to provide child 
support. See Hills, 638 P.2d at 516; Gulley, 570 P.2d at 128. The court held 
that the right to receive child support lies with the minor children, not with 
the spouse who receives the funds on the children's behalf, and it is 
therefore not a right either parent may "barter[ ] away" or uextinguish[ ]." 
Hills, 638 P.2d at 517; see also Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129. Although Hills and 
Gulley addressed the duty of a father to provide support, we see no reason 
why the analysis should not apply equally to both parents. 
Here, while Paragraph 6 does not expressly relieve Wife of her duty to 
provide support, it effectively puts the entire burden of supporting the 
children on Husband, no matter how much income Wife earns. Taken to the 
extreme, Paragraph 6 would require Husband to fully support the children 
even in the event that Wife begins to earn more money than Husband 
because Wife's income could not be considered in any petition to modify 
based on a change of circumstances. The trial court's decision to apply 
Paragraph 6, even after the other provisions dealing with alimony and 
child support were invalidated, was an abuse of discretion because it 
allows Wife to avoid her statutory and inalienable common law duty to 
provide financial support to her children. We therefore remand to the 
trial court with instructions to consider Wife's income in the 
calculation of Husband's monthly child support payments. (Lvmphasis 
added) 
Id. 
In discussing the alimony component, the Sill Court expressly invalidated the use 
of only gross income (the estimate of which was the only indicator of income in the 
Temporary Order or the Amended Findings) in determining alimony: 
Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating his 
alimony obligations based on his gross monthly income instead of his net 
income. Specifically, Husband claims that the trial court improperly ignoied 
his duty to pay taxes and thereby mistakenly overestimated his disposable 
income. In determining alimony, a trial court must consider, along with 
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other factors not under attack in the instant appeal, "the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) 
(Supp.2007). A trial court's " 'findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached/ " Rasband v. Rash andt 752 P.2d 1331, 
1334 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A trial court's 
failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the facts are 
not clear from the record. See id. at 1334-35 (vacating an alimony award 
and remanding for adequate findings). 
Here, the trial court arrived at its alimony award by awarding Wife 
half of Husband's monthly disposable income. The trial court 
determined Husband's disposable income by subtracting certain 
expenses, including housing, food, transportation, and child support, 
from Husband's stipulated gross monthly income. The findings of fact 
are silent on the issue of Husband's tax obligations and monthly net 
income* Even though there is some evidence in the record concerning 
the amount of taxes Husband pays, including testimony by Wife and 
documentary evidence provided by Husband, we cannot ascertain how 
or if the trial court contemplated Husband's duty to pay taxes in 
calculating his disposable income. The trial court's findings of fact are 
not sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took determining 
Husband's disposable income. We therefore reverse and remand for 
adequate findings that will show proper consideration of Husband's net 
income. (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
Simply, the stipulation of the parties, in this case, relating to alimony and child 
support, cannot be construed to relieve the trial court and the parties from their respective 
duties of providing evidence and making detailed findings. Clearly, if the constraction 
urged by Lhe Appellee is upheld, the trial court committed error in allowing the 
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unsupported stipulation of the parties to act as a substitute for detailed findings of fact 
that arc supported by the record in the case. Also, the decision cited above expressly 
rejects the only evidence in this case (the Petitioner's approximation of gross income in 
June, 2004) that was used as a basis of the alimony and child support award. 
On the other hand, the construction urged by the Appellant, that the trial court 
reserved the determination of alimony and child support for future hearings, is entirely 
consistent with the non-waivable duty of the parties to submit evidence and the duty of 
the trial court to authorize specific findings. In accordance with that construction, the 
matter would be remanded for a hearing on the relevant factors to establish the child 
support and alimony levels that were to commence on the entry of the decree of divorce. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT LEVELS ESTABLISHED 
IN THE TEMPORARY ORDER WERE INCORPORATED 
BY THE AMENDED DECREE. 
The language at issue in this case, from the Amended Findings of Fact The 
relevant language, as it relates to the child support and alimony, contained in the 
Amended Findings is as follows: 
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which 
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and 
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of §4,000.00 per month. 
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved 
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
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9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children 
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the 
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
10. All other issues are reserved. 
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by 
the trial court. (Emphasis added) 
(R. 347-370; Addendum, Exhibit "D") 
A. The Appellant/Petitioner's interpretation of the Relevant 
Language. 
The Appellant contends that the Amended Findings are unambiguous. If the 
clauses recited above, are read together, in context, it is submitted that there is only one 
reasonable way for the language to bed interpreted. The parties could not, and did not 
intend, to divest the trial court of its obligation of hearing the necessary evidence 
regarding the income and expenses of the parties and the other factors relevant to a 
determination of child support and alimony. It is clear from the record that the parties 
had not yet engaged in discovery regarding those factors and did not have sufficient 
information to even file a child support worksheet3 with the proposed Amended Finding, 
3 
U.C.A. 78-45-7.3(1) (2000 as Amended) requires that "[i]n any matter in which child 
support is ordered, the moving party shall submit: (a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); (c) a written 
statement indicating whether or not the amount of child support requested is 
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Conclusions and Amended Decree. Neither attorney for the parties could have even 
recommended a specific child support or alimony award based upon the absence of any 
documentation. 
Accordingly, the intent of the provisions contained in the Amended Findings was 
first, to allow the Petitioner six months to provide evidence in support of his claim that 
the child support and alimony award, established in the temporary order of August 11, 
2004 (which was effective from June 1, 2004 to the date of the Decree, October 7, 2004), 
should be reduced based upon the significant decline in his income he had experienced 
after the stipulation supporting the August 11, 2004 order was signed in June, 2004. 
Appellant contends that the six month window related only to his right to challenge the 
terms of the temporary order that terminated with the entry of the Decree on October 7, 
2004. 
Second, Appellant contends that the determination of child support and alimony, 
that were to be effective with the entry of the Decree, on October 7, 2004, was reserved 
with the other financial issues by Paragraphs 10 and 16. Finally, Paragraph 9 of the 
Amended Findings is entirely consistent with the position of the Appellant in that it 
carves out also, the period of time from the stipulation resulting in the temporary order, 
June, 2004 to October 2004 for the consideration of the effect of Appellant having 
consistent with the guidelines; and (d) the information required under Subsection (3). 
See also, Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
32 
custody of the children during those two months. The reason the court reserved the child 
support amount for August and September, 2004, is because the Appellant/Petitioner had 
custody during those two months and because the Appellant had reserved the right to 
demonstrate that the base amount entered in the temporary order should be modified 
based upon his decrease in income. 
When the Appellant did not press the issue, because of the inability to pay attorney 
fees, within the six-month period of time, all that was lost, in the Appellant's view, was 
his right to contest the amount of alimony and child support during the period from June, 
2004 to the entry of the Decree in October, Appellant always believed that the level of 
support, effective with October, 2004, would be established at a new hearing. 
B. The Appellant's Interpretation is Supported by the Case Law 
Regarding Interpretation of Decrees. 
As noted in Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah App.,1998) (overturned on 
other grounds), the court interprets a divorce decree according to established rales of 
contract interpretation. Cf. fffyitehouse v. Wliitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). In Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), 
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the analysis that courts must use in determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous: "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, 
any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268. A court must "consider the writing 
in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id However, if the court considers such 
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evidence and detemiines that the language of the contract is unambiguous, "then the 
parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Id. 
"Language in a written document is ambiguous if the words used may be understood to 
support two or mors plausible meanings." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added); 
see also R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (" 
cTo demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.' " 
(citation omitted)). Finally, whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which 
the reviewing court reviews for correctness. See Intenvest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 
1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996). 
It is submitted that based upon the wording of the Amended Findings, the 
interpretation offered by the Appellant is reasonable, consistent with the law that the trial 
court must enter detailed findings supported by the evidence, and in keeping with the 
intent of the parties, as abstracted from the document. 
If, however, the Court finds that the language is capable of more than one 
interpretation, the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the intent of 
the parties. 
C. The Appellant's Interpretation is Consistent with the 
Subsequent Actions of the Parties. 
The record in this case reveals that the Decree was entered on October 7, 2004. 
Six months would have expired in April, 2005. If the Respondent/Appellee really 
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believed that the alimony and child support levels from the temporary order were 
intended, but for the six-month right of the Appellant, to continue on after the entry of the 
Decree and Amended Decree, there would have been no reason to conduct discovery 
related to the income and expenses of the parties. However, the Record reflects that the 
Respondent/Appellee was sending discovery requests in August, 2005, long after the 
expiration of the six-month period. (R. 445) In fact, on August 19, 2005, the Respondent 
filed eleven (11) subpoenas duces tecum addressed to the Appellant's employers, banks 
and other sourced from which the information required to assess alimony and child 
support could be obtained. (R. 379-444) 
The Pretrial Conference held on December 8, 2005, primarily dealt with the 
demands of each of the parties regarding discovery. Respondent actually obtained an 
Order detailing the Appellant/Petitioner's obligation to supply requested information on 
January 9, 2006. (R. 471-473) Ongoing discovery was discussed in the Pretrial 
Conference of January 31, 2006. (R. 474) The Petitioner/Appellant was conducting 
discovery on the income and expenses of the Respondent in January, 2006 (R. 475-80). 
Importantly, the only issue that could possible have been referred to in the 
Amended Findings' reservation of issues, was the assessment of child support and 
alimony. There were no other financial or other issues existing at the time of the 
Amended Decree. 
D. The Appellant's Interpretation is Consistent with the Law 
Regarding the Expiration of Temporary Orders. 
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In Druce v. Druce 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"We therefore hold that payments that become due and payable under a temporary order 
may be reduced to judgment after the entry of the fmal decree, despite the failure of that 
decree to expressly preserve them." 
Therefore, the alimony due and owing, under the temporary order, may be 
rendered to judgment following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. HOWEVER, the 
temporary order ceases to exist and the permanent order, as set forth in the Amended 
Decree of Divorce, is controlling as to the issues of child support and alimony. 
The Respondent is not able to just "assume51 the terms of the temporary order after 
the new order was entered which reserved the Petitioner's claims that lower amounts 
should be entered. "When a temporary is followed by a permanent order, the temporary 
order merges into the permanent order." See Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 885 
P.2d 990,994, (Utah 1993) and also Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001). In 
this case, the prior amounts of child support and alimony were not reaffirmed, but were 
reserved - that is no orders were made and it was anticipated that there would be new 
order for the alimony and child support to be awarded effective with the entry of the 
Decree. 
It should be noted that the Court's decision in Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 
814 (Utah App. 1992), which is referenced in the trial court's decision is inapposite to the 
issues in this case. See, R. 690-91. As carefully explained above, the Appellant is not 
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seeking to amend a temporary order. Appellant recognizes that he had six months to seek 
the review of the temporary order that governed the alimony and child support levels to 
October 1, 2004. Appellant acknowledges that no review of that order and time period 
was requested. Appellant vehemently asserts that the temporary order, however, 
terminated with the entry of the Decree in October, 2004. 
POINT IV: EQUITY DICTATES THAT THE COURT ALLOW A 
FULL HEARING ON THE ISSUES ATTENDANT TO ALIMONY 
AND CHILD SUPPORT. 
In each of the statutes relating to alimony and child support cited herein and in the 
interpreting case law, the court's determination of the level of child support and alimony 
is to be guided by principles of equity. A hearing on the required elements of both 
alimony and child support has not been conducted in this case and the facts and 
information required to set a legal amount have not been tendered to the court. Certainly, 
the parties are entitled to a ruling that would allow a complete hearing and the setting of 
child support and alimony that is mandated by the financial information supplied by the 
parties. 
Enforcing the terms of the temporary order, after the entry of the Decree would not 
be fair and equitable. For instance, the Record in this case does contain the response of 
the Respondent's employer, Financial Freedom to a subpoena, which details a monthly 
salary for the Respondent of $3,000 that existed clear back to June, 2005. (R. 613-622) 
The representation in the Temporary Order of August 11, 2004 that the Respondent was 
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unemployed did not reflect the Respondent's circumstances after the Decree. Appellant 
believes that the Respondent was employed around the time of the entry of the Decree. 
The Appellant/Petitioner employment at the time of the August 11, 2004 
Temporary Hearing failed. He was employed in 2006 for a monthly salary of $4,375.00 
per month, net. His monthly expenses assuming only a $3,000 payment to the 
Respondent are over $8,000 a month. (R. 789-96) The Appellee/Respondent has not filed, 
at an time in this case, a financial declaration relating to her income and expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the law and the facts of this case, Appellant requests an order 
reversing the district court's determination and adjudging that the Temporary Order of 
August 11, 2004, terminated on the entry of the Decree of Divorce, October 7, 2004. 
Appellant requests that the matter be remanded for a hearing on child support and 
alimony levels and arrearages, if any, to be effective with the entry of the Decree, 
October 7, 2004. 
Dated this ff 2> day of January, 2008> 
'ROSEMOJJtf 6. BLAKELOCK, ESQ 
fney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on theyy day of January, 2008, two copies of the Appellant's Brief 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott P. Card, Esq. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
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Addendum 
Addendum 
Exhibit "A"-Stipulation and Order 
of Temporary Support, Dated August 11, 2004 
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803 
MOODY BROWN & BROWN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2525 N[. Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 356-8300 
Fax; (SOI) 356-8400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENTXEY D.WILSON, 
Petitioner* 
v. 
BRENDAH.WTtSON, 
Respondent, 
STIPULATION OF TEMPORARY 
SUPPORT 
Civil No. 034402561 DA 
Division No,6 
COME NOW the parties undersigned and represent to the Court that the following terms are 
fair and reasonable. The parties stipulate and agree, as follows: 
1, Children, There have been four children born as issue of this marriage: Paile 
C. Wilson, bam November 12,1984; Madelyne A. Wilson, born September U, 1988; Bentlcy D. 
Wilson, bom September \ 1,1993; and, William M, Wilson, born May 6,1997. 
2, Custodv/P^rent time. The Mother is awarded temporaryCustody of the niiaor 
rov\ 
children, subject to the Father's riglit to parent time with the children at reasonable times and 
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places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in accordance with U.C A §30-
3-35; however, the wishes of the children will be considered and the children will not be forced 
to participate in parent time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the children from 
Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday (one hour before the children's church time commences), The 
Father will also have ana week of extended visitation with the children in the summer, 
3, Child Support. The Father fftprcsfints His gross monthly income is 
approxnnatcly $ 10,000 per month, The Respcmdentk qjramtly unemployed. The Father will 
pay child support of $700 per rt\£ •er ptol& ) The child'support obligation of the Father 
should be effective Febnwy^, 2004, and continue during the pendency of this action. Each 
party will pay one-half all costs of extracurricular activities for the children* 
4, Alimony. The Wife should be awarded a BVHB*d$37?£Q4ier month as 
m 
temporary alimony from the Husband, eommenc ing^^ f^ l , 2004, and continuing during the 
pendancy of this action, 
5. Medical/pental Exposes, The Father will maintain health insurance coverage 
for medical and dental expenses far the minor children; The Father shall also pay all costs of the 
premium for the medical and dental health insurance, ^ach parent Shall share equally all 
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling, 
prescriptions, deductibles, and oopaymenta, incurred fcjr the dependent children and actually paid 
by the parents 
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Dated this day of Jwie,2004. N « N \ 
BENfCEY WILSON, Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of June, 2004. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Provo>Utah 
My Commission Expires: _ 
Dated thisi_2 cUiy of Jime,2004. 
M 
BRENDAH, WILSON, Respondent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __2~2W of June, 2004. 
<$m^ MARTA W. WHITTiNGTON 
c ^ f g § , immPum-siMoiaw 
% f l l i S 88? N. UNIVERSITY AVE. {00&mj0 PftOVO, UTAH 64(304 
' ' Q J E : ^ C^W EXP. 3-24-2005 
HAJAMJUJ muffle 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Provo.Utah 3 / ' " 2 4 - / # 
My Commission Expires: 
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803 
MOODY BROWN & BROWN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2525 N. Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)356-8300 
Fax: (801) 356-8400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENTLEY D. WILSON, : ORDER OF TEMPORARY 
SUPPORT 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
BRENDA H. WILSON, : 
Civil No. 034402561 DA 
Respondent. : 
Division No.6 
Based on the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered, 
adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. Children. There have been four children born as issue of this marriage: Daile 
C. Wilson, born November 12, 1984; Madelyne A. Wilson, born September 11,1988; Bentley D. 
Wilson, born September 11, 1993; and, William M. Wilson, born May 6, 1997. 
2. Custody/Parent time. The Mother is awarded temporary physical custody of 
the minor children, subject to the Father's right to parent time with the children at reasonable 
times and places as the parties may agree. The holidays will be alternated in accordance with 
U.C.A. §30-3-35; however, the wishes of the children will be considered and the children will 
not be forced to participate in parent time. The Father will have alternating weekends with the 
children from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday (one hour before the children's church time 
commences). The Father will also have one week of extended visitation with the children in the 
summer. 
3. Child Support. The Father represents his gross monthly income is 
approximately $10,000 per month. The Respondent is currently unemployed. The Father will 
pay child support of $700 per month per minor child. The child support obligation of the Father 
shall be effective June 1, 2004, and continue during the pendency of this action. Each party will 
pay one-half all costs of extracurricular activities for the children. 
4. Credit. The Petitioner shall receive credit for all child support amounts paid 
in June 2004, which was $2,250. 
5. Alimony. The Wife is awarded a sum of $4,000 per month as temporary 
alimony from the Husband, commencing June 1, 2004, and continuing during the pendency of 
this action. 
6. Medical/Dental Expenses. The Father will maintain health insurance coverage 
for medical and dental expenses for the minor children. The Father shall also pay all costs of the 
premium for the medical and dental health insurance. Each parent shall share equally all 
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reasonable and necessary uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling, 
prescriptions, deductibles, and copayments, incurred for the dependent children and actually paid 
by the parents. 
7. Other Issues. All other issues are reserved and the temporary orders contained 
herein may be reviewed upon request of either party. 
DATED this j^ifey^-HtrlyrSQM,—- y/o/oQ 
Approved as to form: 
ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK 
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NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Respondent, will submit the 
above and foregoing Order of Temporary Support to the Fourth District Court for signature upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of 
the State of Utah. 
? 
Dated this J_ day July,2004. 
MARILYN MOODY BROWN 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this o day of July, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order of Temporary Support, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Rosemond Blakelock 
Attorney at Law 
75S300W 
Provo, UT 84601 
lM?UM 
Wp\S-Z\wilsoiiB.ord.temp 
July 3, 2004 
Addendum 
Exhibit "B"-Order on Order to Show Cause 
Dated August 26, 2004 
'0 
ROSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK #6183 
Attorney for Petitioner 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)379-0700 
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT INI AND FOR 
BLED 
Fourth Ju^'ml District Cou® 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
BENTLEY D. WILSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRENDA H.WILSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case No. 034402561 
Commissioner Patton 
Division 6 
This matter came on as for hearing on August 5, 2004, before Commissioner Thomas 
Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent was 
not present, nor was she represented by counsel. The Petitioner's counsel, Rosemond Blakelock, 
informed the Court that she had received an Appearance of Counsel from James Haskins, but that 
no other communication was received other than the Appearance of Counsel. The Court 
examined the file and the contents therein and noted that the Respondent had been personally 
served with an Order to Show Cause signed by Judge Fred Howard on July 20, 2004. The Court 
examined the file and noted that no responsive pleadings of any kind were in the file, and 
concluded that the hearing should proceed as ordered and scheduled. Based upon the file and the 
contents therein the default of the Respondent was entered and the Court orders as follows; 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
1. The Petitioner is hereby granted the temporary physical custody of the minor 
children. 
2. The Court shall immediately appoint a custody evaluator and shall order that the 
Respondent cooperate with the evaluator so that if the children are in any danger when with the 
Respondent that it can be determined. 
3. The Petitioner shall pick-up the car, and shall be responsible for the payments 
thereon. 
DATED and SIGNED this <p ^ day of / k j > ^ . , 2004. 
Commissioner Thomas Patton 
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James Haskins 
357 South 200 East Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RULE 7 NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted submit 
the above and foregoing Order to the Court, for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the order should be filed with the Court, within five 
days after service upon you of this notice. 
DATED this 6th day of August 2004 
RQSEM6ND BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of August 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above. 
CegahAs&tetanf 
Addendum 
Exhibit "C"-Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce dated October 7, 2004 
Fourth Juc&7>£: Omnrt Court 
of Utah Ooimw, Sime of Utah 
Rosemond B l a k e l o c k #6183 
A t t o r n e y f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
75 S o u t h 300 West 
P r o v o , U t a h 84601 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 7 5 - 7 6 7 8 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENTLEY D. WILSON, 
* DECREE OF DIVORCE 
P e t i t i o n e r , * 
v . * 
* 
BRENDA H. WILSON, *. Case No. 034402561 
* 
Respondent. * 
This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as 
for hearing before Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the 
Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent 
was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The 
parties placed their stipulation into the record and each party 
affirmed on the record that each understood that once the 
stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound 
by the terms, as set forth below. The Court accepted the 
Affidavit of the Petitioner as to grounds and jurisdiction. The 
Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming 
itself to be fully informed in the premises, having issued 
icjolai -tk- Deputy 
10" 31 #^ 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now orders and rules as 
follows; 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. 1. The bonds of matrimony heretofore existing by and 
between the Petitioner and Respondent are hereby dissolved, and 
Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
Respondent. 
2. The parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne born 
September 11, 1988, Bentley Dunford II, born September 11,1993 
and William McKinley born May 6, 1997. 
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted 
joint legal custody of the minor children, with the Respondent 
being designated as having the primary physical custody of the 
minor children. 
4. The Petitioner shall be awarded parenting time with the 
minor children as follows; 
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, 
the following schedule shall be considered the minimum 
parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) Wednesday evening from the time the child11 s school 
is regularly dismissed until the following morning (Thursday) at 
which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to 
school. This overnight shall occur In weeks in which the 
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Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end 
visitation, on weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation 
with the minor children, the week-day visitation shall be from 
the time school is out until 8:30 p.m. 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 
2004, from the time school is out until the following Monday, 
October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the 
minor children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend 
visitation with the minor children shall be every other weekend 
from, from Friday following school until the following Monday 
morning at which time the Petitioner shall take the children to 
school. 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, 
and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, 
the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the childTs 
attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or 
Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so 
that the child is free from school and the parent is free from 
work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to 
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this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, 
parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the 
time the childTs school is regularly dismissed at the beginning 
of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the 
holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child1s birthday on the day before or after the actual 
birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of 
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the 
birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on 
the day school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time 
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to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday 
until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran1s Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
Until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he 
may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time 
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to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, 
including New YearTs Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3) (b) 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as 
the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year 
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father1s Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive 
father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive 
mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
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(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the 
noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to 
parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week 
period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer 
vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the 
noncustodial parent's extended parent-time shall be H of the 
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks 
with the child shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to 
the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours•and for 
reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with 
this section by either parent concerning parent-time shall be 
made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time 
order. 
7. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and 
parenting plan; 
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(A) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both 
parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution; 
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize 
the continuity and stability of the children's life; 
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to 
make the child available to attend family functions including 
funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, 
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of 
the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently 
conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times 
specified and return the child at the times specified above, and 
the childrenTs regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for 
parent-time at the time they are to be picked up and shall be 
present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they 
are returned; 
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both 
parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
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noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized 
parent-time provided above. 
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the 
parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld 
due to either parentTs failure to comply with a court-ordered 
parent-time schedule; 
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, 
sports, and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be 
entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical 
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent 
in the event of a medical emergency; 
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current 
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone 
contact during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges 
with the children; 
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(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for 
the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the 
parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers 
with the name, current address, and telephone number of the other-
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care 
providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of 
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the 
parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent 
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the 
child on the religious holiday. 
5. Both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce 
Education for Parents" as required by law. 
6. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child 
support and alimony. The issue of whether or not a reduction 
should be granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so 
that each party is able to obtain further information regarding 
the Petitioner's actual income. 
10 
7. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the 
minor children during the months of August and September. 
Therefore, the issue of the amount of Petitioner7 s actual child 
support obligation for August 2004 and September 2 004 is reserved 
for final determination by the Court. 
8. The financial, real and personal property issues are 
reserved. 
9. Both parties should be equally responsible and liable for 
paying the health, optical, hospital, and dental expenses for the 
parties1 minor children, which are uncovered by insurance. When 
health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to 
either party at a reasonable cost, that party should obtain the 
health insurance and each party should be responsible for one-
half of the cost of insurance for the minor children. 
10. Neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or 
disparage the other and neither shall allow any third party to 
harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is restrained and 
prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of 
the other party to discuss the divorce proceedings, custody or 
the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the business 
or personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall 
speak negatively about the other in the presence of the minor 
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children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation 
with the minor children. 
11. The Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul 
Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as may be necessary for pre or post 
visitation sessions with the minor children as may be deemed 
necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for 
costs associated with either Dr. Jenkins or Dr. Hyde. 
12. The Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the 
amount of $4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September 
28, 2004. 
13. The Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent in 
her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her. 
14. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for 
further hearing by the trial court. 
DATED this / day of OCT ___, 2004. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRIAN HARRISON 
Brian Harrison 
facsimile: 852-3175 
3651 North 100 East, #100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
RULE 7 NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted the 
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to the Court, for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Decree of Divorce should be filed 
with the Court, within five days after service upon you of this notice. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2004. 
Jorp Pernod for Rosemond Blakelock 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of September, 2004,1 faxed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above. 
,. ,,r KK A i S \An~\ / /\ A. 
Le^-akAssisfa: 'J 
A A A 
Fourth Judinia' - W i t t Court 
of UtaS". County, Stale of Utah 
^.IPjllMJl^-.- Deputy 
Rosemond Blakelock #6183 
Attorney for Petitioner 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
k 
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
* Case No. 034402561 
* 
* 
This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as 
for hearing before Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the 
Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent 
was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The 
parties placed their stipulation into the record and each party 
affirmed on the record that each understood that once the 
stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound 
by the terms, as set forth below. The Court now examines the file 
and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed 
in the premises, now orders and rules as follows; 
BENTLEY D. WILSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BRENDA H. WILSON, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the finds that the Petitioner has 
been an actual and bona fide resident of Utah County, State of 
Utah, for at least three months immediately prior to the filing 
of this divorce action. 
2. The Court finds that the parties are wife and husband, 
having been married on July 30, 1984, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be granted a 
divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
4. The Court finds that the parties have three minor 
children: Madelyne Anne born September 11, 1988, Bentley Dunford 
II, born September 11,1993 and William McKinley born May 6, 1997. 
5. The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent 
should be granted joint legal custody of the minor children, with 
the Respondent being designated as having the primary physical 
custody of the minor children. 
6. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded 
parenting time with the minor children as follows; 
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, 
the following schedule shall be considered the minimum 
parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) Wednesday evening from the time the child's school 
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is regularly dismissed until the following morning (Thursday) at 
which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to 
school. This overnight shall occur in weeks in which the 
Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end 
visitation, on weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation 
with the minor children, the week-day visitation shall be from 
the time school is out until 8:30 p.m. 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 
2004, from the time school is out until the following Monday, 
October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the 
minor children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend 
visitation with the minor children shall be every other weekend 
from, from Friday following school until the following Monday 
morning at which time the Petitioner shall take the children to 
school. 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, 
and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, 
the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the childTs 
attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or 
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Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so 
that the child is free from school and the parent is free from 
work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to 
this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, 
parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the 
time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning 
of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the 
holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the 
Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child1s birthday on the day before or after the actual 
birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of 
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the 
birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday 
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on 
the day school lets out for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
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Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time 
to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday 
until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran1s Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
;il 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take 
other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at. 6 p.m. on 
Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for 
a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent 
is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the 
'WU'l'AV, 
holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly 
known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday 
until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 
p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school 
vacation, including New Year!s Day, as defined in Subsection 
30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year 
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. 
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on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or 
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent 
may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the 
noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to 
parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with these guideline 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical 
two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's 
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the 
noncustodial parent's extended parent-time shall be H of the 
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation 
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 days in 
advance to the other parent; and 
7 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for 
reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with 
this section by either parent concerning parent-time shall be 
made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time 
order. 
7. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and 
parenting plan; 
(A) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both 
parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution; 
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize 
the continuity and stability of the childrenTs life; 
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to 
make the child available to attend family functions including 
funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, 
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of 
the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently 
conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times 
specified and return the child at the times specified above, and 
the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
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(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for 
parent-time at the time they are to be picked up and shall be 
present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they 
are returned; 
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both 
parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized 
parent-time provided above. 
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time 
schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the 
parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld 
due to either parentTs failure to comply with a court-ordered 
parent-time schedule; 
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, 
sports, and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be . 
entitled to attend and participate fully; 
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(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical 
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent 
in the event of a medical emergency; 
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current 
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone 
contact during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges 
with the children; 
(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for 
the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the 
parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers 
with the name, current address, and telephone number of the other 
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care 
providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of 
major religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the 
parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent 
10 
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the 
child on the religious holiday. 
8. The Court finds that both parties have attended the 
course entitled "Divorce Education for Parents" as required by 
law. 
9. The Court finds that the Petitioner has requested a 
reduction in both child support and aliraony. The issue of whether 
or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for a 
period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
10. The Court finds that the Petitioner was awarded the 
physical custody of the minor children during the months of 
August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of 
Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
11. The Court finds that the financial, real and personal 
property issues are reserved. 
12. The Court finds that both parties should be equally 
responsible and liable for paying the health, optical, hospital, 
and dental expenses for the parties1 minor children, which are 
uncovered by insurance. When health, optical, hospital, or 
dental insurance is available to either party at a reasonable 
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cost, that party should obtain the health insurance and each 
party should be responsible for one-half of the cost of insurance 
for the minor children. 
13. The Court finds that neither party shall do anything to 
harm, harass or disparage the other and neither shall allow any 
third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is 
restrained and prohibited from contacting any business associate 
or friends of the other party to discuss the divorce proceedings, 
custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with 
the business or personal activities of the other party. Neither 
party shall speak negatively about the other in the presence of 
the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or 
litigation with the minor children. 
14. The Court finds that the Petitioner may take the minor 
children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as may be 
necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor 
children as may be deemed necessary and proper. The Petitioner 
shall be responsible for costs associated with either Dr. Jenkins 
or Dr. Hyde. 
15. The Court finds that Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers 
check in the amount of $4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m. 
on September 28, 2004. 
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15. The Court finds that the Petitioner shall cooperate with 
the Respondent in her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her. 
16. The Court finds that all other issues not resolved 
herein are reserved for further hearing by the trial court. 
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now issues 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes as a matter of law that it has 
subject and personal jurisdiction over the parties and issues of 
the case. 
2. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the 
Petitioner is entitled to an Decree of Divorce from the 
Respondent, based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
3. The Court concludes that a Decree of Divorce should 
enter, consistent with the Findings of Fact, as set forth above. 
DATED this 
, 7 
day of 6c:r , 2004 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRIAN HARRISON 
Brian Harrison 
facsimile: 852-3175 
3651 North 100 East, #100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
RULE 7 NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Petitioner has submitted the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court, for signature. Pursuant 
to Rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law should be filed with the Court, within five days after service upon you 
of this notice. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2004. 
John jPenrod forRosemond Blakelock 
tomey: Att rne  for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of September, 2004,1 faxed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing documents to the person(s) addressed above. 
Legal Assistant 
A . \ h K v ^ \IA A 
a 
Addendum 
Exhibit "D"-Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce dated November 2, 2004 
h I L b U 
Fourth Judicial Ofvuz Court 
of Utah Ooun-A $!:&;£ of Utah 
lljjAai^^L Deputy 
Rosemond Blakelock #6183 
Attorney for Petitioner 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
BENTLEY D.WILSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BRENDA H.WILSON, 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as for hearing before 
Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. 
The Respondent was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The parties placed 
their stipulation into the record and each party affirmed on the record that each understood that 
once the stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound by the terms, as set forth 
below. The Court accepted the Affidavit of the Petitioner as to grounds and jurisdiction. The 
Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully informed in 
* AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
* Case No. 034402561 
* 
* T ? 
* 
V\k\(AA 
the premises, having issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now orders and rules as 
follows; 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The bonds of matrimony heretofore existing by and between the Petitioner and 
Respondent are heieby dissolved, and Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
Respondent. 
2 The parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne, bom September 11, 1988; 
Bentley Dunford II, bom September 11,1993; and William McKinley, bom May 6, 1997. 
3. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall be granted joint legal custody of the minor 
children, with the Respondent being designated as having the primary physical custody of the 
minor children. 
4. The Petitioner shall be awarded parenting time with the minor children as follows; 
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule 
shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be 
entitled: 
(a) (i) Wednesday evening, at 4:30 p.m., until the following morning (Thursday) 
at which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to school. This overnight shall occur 
in weeks in which the Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end visitation, on 
weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation with the minor children, the week-day 
visitation shall be from 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. The pick-up and drop-off for the minor children 
shall be at curbside for all visitation exchanges. 
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(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 2004, from 4:30 p.m. 
until the following Monday, October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the minor 
children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend visitation with the minor children shall be 
every other weekend from, from Friday at 4:30 p.m. until the following Monday morning at 
which time the Petitioner shall take the children to school. 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not 
be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent 
shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free 
from work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, parent-time over a 
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from 4:30 p.m. on the day that the child's school is 
regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the 
holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled 
to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 
p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along 
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for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely 
entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out 
for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled, 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 
30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
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siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend 
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's 
Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., 
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays m even years and the 
even year holidays in odd years; 
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(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted 
time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended parent-time shall be lA of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either 
parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the 
parent-time order. 
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5. The parties will do their best to comply with schedule expectations. However, they 
understand that delays or problems are unavoidable. Either party shall notify the other if there 
will be a delay of more than fifteen minutes. Respondent shall have the children ready for 
visitation within 15 minutes of the times set forth herein and the Petitioner shall return the 
children within 15 minutes of the time set forth herein. 
6. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and parenting plan; 
(A) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable 
to a court-imposed solution; 
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and 
stability of the children's life; 
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available 
to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, 
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either 
parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times specified and return the 
child at the times specified above, and the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for parent-time at the time 
they are to be picked up and shall be present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they are returned; 
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(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided above. 
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's 
failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule; 
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice 
of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone 
number within 24 hours of any change; 
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during 
reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the children; 
(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate 
care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
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(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current 
address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with 
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court 
for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays 
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent 
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
7. Both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce Education for Parents" as 
required by law. 
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which has 
previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and alimony which has been 
ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. The issue of whether or not a reduction should be 
granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children during the 
months of August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of Petitioner's actual child 
support obligation for August 2004 and September 2004 is reserved for final determination by 
the Court. 
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10. All other issues are reserved. 
11. Both parties should be equally responsible and liable for paying the health, optical, 
hospital, and dental expenses for the parties' minor children, which are uncovered by insurance. 
When health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to either party at a reasonable cost, 
that party should obtain the health insurance and each party should be responsible for one-half of 
the cost of insurance for the minor children. 
12. Neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or disparage the other and neither shall 
allow any third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is restrained and 
prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of the other party to discuss the 
divorce proceedings, custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the business or 
personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall speak negatively about the other in the 
presence of the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation with the minor 
children. 
13. The Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or Dr. Randy Hyde as 
may be necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor children as may be deemed 
necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for costs associated with either Dr. 
Jenkins or Dr. Hyde. 
14. The Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the amount of $4,434.00 to the 
Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September 28, 2004. 
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15. The Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent and third parties in her attempts to 
get the Toyota returned to her. 
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by the trial court. 
DATED this ^ day of A W - , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
11 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian Harrison 
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Rosemond Blakelock #6183 
Attorney for Petitioner 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
* AMENDED 
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
* 
* Case No. 034402561 
* 
This matter came before the Court on September 27, 2004 as for hearing before 
Commissioner Thomas Patton. Present was the Petitioner and his counsel, Rosemond Blakelock. 
The Respondent was also present and represented by counsel Brian Harrison. The parties placed 
their stipulation into the record and each party affirmed on the record that each understood that 
once the stipulation was placed into the record that each party is bound by the terms, as set forth 
below. The Court now examines the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to be fully 
informed in the premises, now orders and rules as follows; 
u U U 3 5 8 
l\\^\ljl^^Depu^ 
BENTLEY D.WILSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BRENDAH. WILSON, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the finds that the Petitioner has been an actual and bona fide 
resident of Utah County, State of Ulah, for at least three months immediately prior to the filing of 
this divorce action. 
2. The Court finds that the parties are wife and husband, having been married on July 30, 
1984, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be granted a divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences. 
4. The Court finds that the parties have three minor children: Madelyne Anne, bom 
September 11,1988; Bentley Dunford II, born September 11,1993; and William McKinley, born 
May 6, 1997. 
5. The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent should be granted joint legal 
custody of the minor children, with the Respondent being designated as having the primary 
physical custody of the minor children. 
6. The Court finds that the Petitioner should be awarded parenting time with the minor 
children as follows; 
(A) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule 
shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the Petitioner and the children shall be 
entitled: 
(a) (i) Wednesday evening, at 4:30 p.m., until the following morning (Thursday) 
at which time the Petitioner shall deliver the minor children to school. This overnight shall occur 
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in weeks in which the Petitioner does not have the minor children as for week-end visitation, on 
weeks where the Petitioner has week-end visitation with the minor children, the week-day 
visitation shall be from 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. The pick-up and drop-off for the minor children 
shall be at curbside for all visitation exchanges. 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning Friday October 1, 2004, from 4:30 p.m. 
until the following Monday, October 4, 2004 at which time the Petitioner will deliver the minor 
children to school. The Petitioner's right to weekend visitation with the minor children shall be 
every other weekend from, from Friday at 4:30 p.m. until the following Monday morning at 
which time the Petitioner shall take the children to school. 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not 
be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent 
shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free 
from work, the noncustodial/Petitioner parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the Petitioner/noncustodial parent, parent-time over a 
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from 4:30 p.m. on the day that the child's school is 
regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the 
holiday weekend; 
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(f) in years ending in an odd number, the Petitioner/noncustodial parent is entitled 
to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 
p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along 
for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out 
for the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 
30~3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Cliristmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided; 
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(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend 
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's 
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Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., 
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the 
even year holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother eveiy year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial 
parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted 
time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended parent-time shall be lA of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
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(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either 
parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the 
parent-time order. 
7. The court finds that the parties shall do their best to comply with schedule 
expectations. However, they understand that delays or problems are unavoidable. Either party 
shall notify the other if there will be a delay of more than fifteen minutes. Respondent shall have 
the children ready for visitation within 15 minutes of the times set forth herein and the Petitioner 
shall return the children within 15 minutes of the time set forth herein. 
8. The parties shall follow the following guidelines and parenting plan; 
(A) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable 
to a court-imposed solution; 
(B) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and 
stability of the children's life; 
(C) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available 
to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, 
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either 
parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule; 
(D) the Petitioner shall pick up the children at the times specified and return the 
child at the times specified above, and the children's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
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(E) the Respondent parent shall have the children ready for parent-time at the time 
they are to be picked up and shall be present at the Respondent's home or shall make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the children at the time they are returned; 
(F) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided above. 
(G) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time; 
(H) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's 
failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule; 
(I) the Respondent shall notify the Petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice 
of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and the Petitioner shall be entitled to attend and participate folly; 
(J) the Petitioner shall have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(K) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone 
number within 24 hours of any change; 
(L) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during 
reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the children; 
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(M) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate 
care and the court shall encourage the pailies to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care; 
(N) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current 
address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with 
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court 
for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(0) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays 
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent 
does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
9. The Court finds that both parties have attended the course entitled "Divorce Education 
for Parents" as required by law. 
10. The Court finds that the Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, 
which has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100.00 per month, and alimony which 
has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. The issue of whether or not a reduction 
should be granted shall be reserved for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain 
further information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
11. The Court finds that the Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor 
children during the months of August and September. Therefore, the issue of the amount of 
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Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and September 2004 is reserved for 
final determination by the Court. 
12. The Court finds that all other issues are reserved. 
13. The Court finds that both parties should be equally responsible and liable for paying 
the health, optical, hospital, and dental expenses for the parties' minor children, which are 
uncovered by insurance. When health, optical, hospital, or dental insurance is available to either 
party at a reasonable cost, that party should obtain the health insurance and each party should be 
responsible for one-half of the cost of insurance for the minor children. 
14. The Court finds that neither party shall do anything to harm, harass or disparage the 
other and neither shall allow any third party to harm, harass or disparage the other. Each party is 
restrained and prohibited from contacting any business associate or friends of the other party to 
discuss the divorce proceedings, custody or the other party. Neither party shall interfere with the 
business or personal activities of the other party. Neither party shall speak negatively about the 
other in the presence of the minor children and neither party shall discuss custody or litigation 
with the minor children. 
15. The Court finds that the Petitioner may take the minor children to Dr. Paul Jenkins or 
Dr. Randy Hyde as may be necessary for pre or post visitation sessions with the minor children as 
may be deemed necessary and proper. The Petitioner shall be responsible for costs associated 
with cither Dr. Jenkins or Dr. Hyde. 
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16. The Court finds that Petitioner shall deliver a cashiers check in the amount of 
$4,434.00 to the Respondent by 5:00 p.m. on September 28, 2004. 
17. The Court finds that the Petitioner shall cooperate with the Respondent and third 
parties in her attempts to get the Toyota returned to her. 
18. The Court finds that all other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further 
hearing by the trial court. 
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now issues the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes as a matter of law that it has subject and personal jurisdiction 
over the parties and issues of the case. 
2. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the Petitioner is entitled to an Decree of 
Divorce from the Respondent, based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
3. The Court concludes that a Decree of Divorce should enter, consistent with the 
Findings of Fact, as set forth above. 
DATED this £- day of fJoV- , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brian Harrison 
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Exhibit "E"-Order and Judgment 
dated October 25, 2006 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C. 
Brian C. Harrison (#1388) 
Attorney for Respondent 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7700 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENTLEY WILSON, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
•vs -
BRENDA WILSON, 
Respondent, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 034402561 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
September 18, 200 6, Petitioner being present and represented 
by his attorney, Rosemond Blakelock, and the Respondent being 
present and represented by her attorney, Brian C. Harrison, 
and the Court having considered the argument of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. A twenty-five (25) minute rule shall apply for 
visitation purposes and all pick-up and drop-off shall be 
curbside. 
2. Respondent is granted a judgment against Petitioner 
for delinquent child support and alimony in the sum of 
$108,116.00 through September, 2006. This judgment is based 
upon the following: 
a. The Court's prior Order of August 10, 2004 for 
temporary child support and alimony has not 
been modified; 
b. Petitioner requested a reduction in child 
support and alimony on September 27, 2004, and 
his request was reserved for a period of six 
(6) months. Petitioner failed to take any 
action during said six (6) months and therefor 
the temporary Order remains in full force and 
effect; 
C. The Court finds that the burden to move 
forward on Petitioner' s request for reduction 
was Petitioner's burden and not Respondent's; 
d. Petitioner recognized his support obligation 
by making periodic payments, but failed to 
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take any action to have his request for 
reduction considered by the court. 
3. Petitioner is granted two (2) weeks from September 
18, 200 6 to show evidence of payments which he has made and 
for which he has not received credit. 
The issue of attorney's fees is reserved. 
DATED: tflJPt^ ^(fafiL 
t "/->% 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT 1/ m^^/ 
COMMISSIONER 
Approved as to Form: 
Rosemond Blakelock 
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NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: ROSE BLAKELOCK 
The foregoing ORDER will be submitted to the Court for 
execution and entry. Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or 
five (5) days plus three (3) days after mailing for opposing 
parties to submit notice of objection. If such objection is 
not received within the prescribed time period, the ORDER 
will be submitted for signing and entry by the Court. 
DATED this rz ^ day of September, 2006. 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed and faxed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing on this ^ r day of 
C&pWX\)D&Y' # 2006, by first-class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Rose Blakelock 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Fax No. 379-0701 
Sectjltary " 
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Addendum 
Exhibit "F"-Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment dated March 27, 2007 
SCOTT P. CARD (#6847) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)426-8200 
Facsimile: (801) 426-8208 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN TLIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BENTLEY WILSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRENDA HALTON WILSON, 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter came before the Court at a hearing on January 2, 2007. The 
Petitioner, Bentley Wilson originally brought this matter through a written Motion and from oral 
argument received on January 2, 2007, wherein he objects to the Commissioner's Judgment in 
favor of Respondent entered on September 18, 2006. Petitioner's Objection is granted in part 
and denied in part. 
Findings of Fact 
1. On August 11, 2004, a Temporary Order was entered regarding alimony and child 
support. In that Order respondent was given temporary physical custody and Petitioner was 
"; Uo-jray, Stc/;-i 
-? 
US 3-2.7~£>l 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and JUDGMENT 
(Hearing date: Jan. 2, 2007) 
Case No: 034402561 
awarded visitation. In that Order child support was set for $700 per-month per-child and $4,000 
per-month of alimony was awarded to Respondent. 
2. On August 26, 2004, custody was changed to the Petitioner and Respondent was 
given visitation. 
3. On September 22, 2004, another order was entered into a Stipulation which 
resulted in a Decree of Divorce, which was signed and entered on October 7, 2004. It appears 
that Petitioner had custody of the children from August 26, 2004 to October 7, 2004. 
4. The Divorce Decree changed custody from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The 
Decree reserved the issue of what amounts Petitioner needed to pay for the months of August and 
September of 2004. The section of the Decree that is most germane to this Ruling is paragraph 
eight which reads: 
The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The 
issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved for a 
period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further information 
regarding Petitioner's actual income. (Emphasis added) 
5. Six months came and passed and the Petitioner failed to file a document with the 
court, or make any attempt to verify his allegedly modified income. 
6. The Commissioner held a hearing on September 18, 2006, wherein he considered 
the facts that are presently before this court. The Commissioner held in part that 1: the 
Temporary Order from August 11, 2004, was not modified and remained in force, 2) Petitioner 
had failed to take any action during the six months in which he could have altered the Temporary 
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Order, 3) Petitioner owed $108,116.00 through September, 2006. 
7. The Commissioner's decision was based on the information provided by the 
parties and appellate court decisions. The commissioner discussed the Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 
633 (Utah 1987), case, but found that the Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 
1992) decision was more applicable to the facts before the court. The Commissioner noted that 
Whitehead stood for the general rule that "once temporary support obligations become due, they 
are no more retroactively modifiable than final decrees" but also provided for some exceptions to 
this rule. The Commissioner noted that Petitioner asked the court to "carve out an exception to 
the general mle prohibiting retroactive modification of family support obligations." Id. At 816. It 
was the finding of the Commissioner that the time for applying any such exception to the general 
rule lapsed when Petitioner failed to act within the six months contemplated by the Divorce 
Decree. He therefore entered Judgment in favor of the Respondent, holding Petitioner 
responsible for any and all obligations for which he could not provide proof of payment for 
within two weeks. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, hereby enters the following 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
CONCL USIONS OF LA WAND JUDGMENT 
1. Having carefully considered the Commissioner findings, the relevant case law, 
and the arguments offered by the parties the Petitioner's Objection is granted in part, and denied 
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in part. 
2. The judgment recommended by the Commissioner was $108,116.00. This court 
is persuaded that Petitioner should not be responsible for the child support payments from 
August 26, 2004, to October 7, 2004, when the Divorce Decree was signed. This court is aware 
that child support orders typically remain in force despite a temporary custody change, as agreed 
by the parties. In this instance, however, the court will excuse Petitioner from payment of child 
support for a month and a half, which is effectively the amount of time he had custody of the 
children. The exact amount excused is $700 per-child for the month, and $350 per-child for the 
half month. It should be noted, however, that Petitioner is still responsible for alimony for this 
time period. Therefore, Judgment is granted to the Respondent, Brenda Wilson, against the 
Petitioner in the amount of $107,066.00 for his past child support and alimony obligations owed 
through September 2006. 
3. This court does not believe that the Commissioner wrongfully entered judgment 
based on Temporary Orders that were superseded by the Divorce Decree, and thereby denies this 
portion of Petitioner's objection. This decision is supported by the Divorce Decree and the 
relevant case law. 
4. Petitioner alleges that the "temporary orders merged into the Decree of Divorce 
and cannot be enforced when the Decree of Divorce does not specifically continue the temporary 
orders." Petitioner discussed the case of Druce v. Druce, 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987) which holds 
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that, "payments that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to 
judgment after entry of the final decree, despite the failure of that decree to expressly preserve 
them." Petitioner argues that this holding is inapplicable to the present facts because the "Decree 
is specifically different than the temporary orders." 
5. While the Decree and Order are different they are not mutually exclusive, and in 
fact the Decree implicitly adopts the Temporary Order. Paragraph eight demonstrates this when 
it notes, 
(t)he Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support and alimony. The 
issue of whether or not a redaction should be granted shall be reserved for period 
of six months so that each party is able to obtain further information regarding 
Petitioner's actual income. 
6. In order for an award to be reduced the award must have existed in the first place. 
This paragraph implicitly acknowledges that Petitioner is seeking a reduction of the Temporary 
Order. The $700 per-child and $4,000 in alimony are the only amounts that had ever been 
entered and are logically the amounts referred to in the Decree. 
7. As the Whitehead court observed there are some exceptions to the general rule 
prohibiting the modification of temporary support obligations, however, Petitioner cannot avail 
himself of these exceptions. As the Decree notes, the Petitioner had six months to provide 
accurate information regarding his income and thereby adjust the wards entered in the Temporary 
Order. Petitioner failed to take any action during this time when the possibility of modification 
existed. It is therefore disingenuous for Petitioner to now claim that the inclusion of the 
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Temporary Order in the Decree was wrongful when its inclusion was the direct result of his 
inaction. 
8. In Summary, the Objection to the Commissioner's recommendation is granted in 
part and denied in part. The Objection is well taken inasmuch as Petitioner should not owe for 
the amount of time the children were in his custody. The Objection is denied, however, as it 
relates to inclusion of the Temporary Order in the Divorce Decree. It is the finding of this court 
that the Temporary Order entered on August 11, 2004, was implicitly adopted by Decree of 
Divorce and that the Judgment entered by the Commissioner was correct with the excused 
amounts listed in paragraph 2 in this section entitled Conclusions of Law and Judgment above. 
DATED this 3LL day of jTW^OO^. .... 
m^ 
District Court Judg^ / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE " ' ' - / / v : j . . . . . . 
I hereby certify that on the / > day of /^>^C , 200_^4 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid. 
Rosemond Blakelock 
75 South 3 00 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
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U.R.C.P. RULE 7(f) NOTICE 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment has been submitted to 
the Court for execution and entry. Rule 7(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows five 
(5) days following hand-delivery, or five (5) days plus three (3) days for mailing if service by 
mail, for opposing counsel or opposing parties to submit notice of objection. If such objection as 
to form is not received within the prescribed time period, the Order will be submitted for signing 
by the Court. 
DATED this / 3 day of / t ^ C ^ , 200 2 
v J_ 
SCOTT^PjCA^t),ESQ
 y 
Attomgyfor [respondent] 
